This is cool...though I would somewhat question what this limited engagement's impact on Japanese strategic planning was c. 1940/41.

Of course it is fortunate for Russia (and indeed the rest of us) that Zhukov was stationed in the East...out-of-sight and out-of-mind of Stalin during the Great Purges of the 1930s...otherwise, they'd probably be speaking German in Moscow now.

It seems that the Japanese attack was poorly planned. In terms of troop movement, not bad - but supply lines, lack of armor, and not using combined forces was the end of their attack.

And didn't the Japanese womp the Russians not too much earlier? I truly doubt this had much to do with anything. The materials needed for Japan's war efforts weren't in that part of the USSR - they were south. Had they consolidated those and not been fighting a war with us, they'd likely have pushed into the USSR without any problems.

Well, I've been reading The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West, by Niall Ferguson (highly recommended, btw). He basically agrees with the premise here...that getting their nose bloodied in 1939 on the Manchukuo/Mongolia border DID make a significant effect on Japanese expansion goals. But not necessarily toward the US at that time.

Rather, it changed things from an Northern Strategy (attack on the USSR) to a Southern Strategy (conquest of the European colonies like Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies) which definitely paid off big dividends for the Japanese in the short term.

And Ron is right--the Japanese DID score a somewhat minor tactical victory against the Soviets the year before.

By somewhat minor, you mean destroying one of their navies? At least, I think that's what happened.