The second in a series of occasional essays on various aspects of warfare.

Preface

One of the problems with being a lifelong student of military history is you start assuming everyone knows things that very few people actually do. There have been many times in the past few weeks where I've shouted "DUR!!!" at the TV only to be confronted with a quizzical look from my wife. So, apologies if this all seems a bit too obvious to you, or a gross oversimplification. I'm just trying to make sure we're all working from the same page.

Guerrilla warfare is one of the most complex, and yet paradoxically one of the most simple, forms of warfare man has created. Like chess, the pieces are straightforward, their paths well-known, but in combination give rise to a nearly infinite number of combinations and strategies. Because of this, guerrilla warfare is usually considered one of the more difficult fields of fighting to study, and often seems barely understood by the popular media. We're going to try, in 1500 words or less, to take at least a baby step in rectifying this situation.

First off, it's important to emphasize that because of their very nature guerrilla conflicts are always unique. Generalizations are very difficult, and dangerous besides. It's very tempting to think just because you understand one guerrilla conflict very well, you understand them all. Gigantic volumes have been written simply detailing the differences between the various conflicts. Trying to inflexibly apply rules that worked in one to another can get you killed.That said, comparing all the various conflicts and the writings of the people who fought them does reveal some commonality.

The basic units, the guerrillas themselves, are nearly always taken from the poorest sections of a society. They are usually young men, poorly educated but not stupid, drawn directly from the local population. As such, they come with a built-in knowledge of local language, custom, and geography, items invaluable to a guerrilla's survival.

The leadership of these bands are oftentimes not drawn from the same "local boys" as the rank-and-file. Instead, leaders tend to come from groups of the better educated middle- and upper-class sections of a society. University students and recent graduates are common choices, as their youth and uncritical idealism make them prime candidates for indoctrination, while their education allows them to see alternatives to the injustice the current society is inflicting.

Because guerrillas are at heart a grass-roots movement, they are always chronically short of supplies. Since they have no factories, no foundries, no depots to call on, they must beg, borrow, or steal essentially everything they need to do their job. Simply acquiring and maintaining the advanced weaponry needed to make the entire project work is a major and difficult undertaking.

Because of this utter reliance on the world around them for supply, the guerrilla must have the support of the common people. As Mao Tse-Tung once said, "the guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea." The common people provide the guerrilla with food, shelter, and places to train, as well as accurate and timely information about the enemy. Without the people the guerrilla is simply a starving target hiding in the wilderness. This single factor is central to a guerrilla's existence. Without the people, guerrilla movements wither and die.

The support of an outside "great power" providing weaponry, pots of money, and/or logistical support is nice, but not required for the success of guerrilla operations. If an outsider isn't around to just hand you things like SAMs, recoilless rifles, howitzers, and mortars, then a guerrilla unit will simply attempt buy, borrow, or steal them from the enemy. Don't laugh... the Viet Cong were for a very long time equipped with some of the finest weaponry the US government could provide.

Indoctrination and ideology are also essential to a guerrilla movement's success. You'll always have a certain number of individuals who'll fight just for the sake of fighting, but to really build numbers you must give people something worth fighting for.

It's important to also understand how limited guerrillas really are. While easily able to harass and hinder, they are not capable of occupation in the face of determined, well-organized resistance. They can run amok when all they're facing is infantry, even regular infantry, but when the tanks and planes show up they run or they die. Guerrilla movements can drive "regular" generals insane and hamper their ability to operate, but it takes a regular "real" army to make the final moves in a revolution.This does not mean the guerrilla leaders need to build their own army from scratch, although some have done so. At least as common is co-opting existing generals by indoctrination, blackmail, or kidnapping.

This is why guerrillas need safe places, far away from enemy interference. Without a haven, regulars cannot be trained, supplies cannot be built up, training cannot take place. This is where the dumb luck of geography comes in... some places have terrain almost purpose-built to hide huge numbers of people doing really noisy things, while others make it impossible for three guys to stand together without being noticed.

While it is very difficult for a guerrilla force to win, it's equally (and more famously) difficult for them to lose. Because a guerrilla is as much about mindset as equipment or training, they can fade back into the peasantry as quickly as they sprang up, only to return again when the conditions are right. When lead well, guerrillas never even attempt to confront their enemies under anything other than ideal conditions. Again, Mao: "When the enemy advances, withdraw; when he stops, harass; when he tires, strike; when he retreats, pursue." If the enemy won't stand and fight, and looks exactly like a peasant once he's ditched his rifle, it's just about impossible to win a battle with him.

This does not mean guerrilla forces are invincible, far from it. Guerrilla movements are created by external conditions, and it is only by controlling and removing these external conditions that they can be reliably defeated. Sometimes this is simply not possible... a brutal, corrupt dictatorship is not going to introduce land reform or give away its power, no matter how many soldiers die in ambushes. In such places the best that can be hoped for is a bloody stalemate, with both sides grinding away at each other, sometimes for decades at a time.

When the conditions can be alleviated, guerrilla movements evaporate like puddles on a hot street. However, these conditions are by no means obvious, and their solutions not simple at all. Roads, bridges, schools, and hospitals can be built by the dozen, but if half the project is sucked up in graft and the other half is spent meeting the requirements on the cheap, nothing will be gained. Children can be sent to schools and protected on safe streets but if it requires the locals to be uprooted from the land of their ancestors they'll simply move right back where they started, and send their sons to fight the infidel. Fences can be constructed and leaders assassinated, but as long as settlements are built in the heart of an erstwhile homeland while bags of money are being handed over the border by cynical fools, nothing will change.

So when you hear the report of a bombing, consider the targets. Were they soldiers, or their supporters? Were they instead common people, or those known to help them? Are soldiers working with the locals, or are they trying to sweep the opposition aside so that a "new order" can take hold? Are the guerrillas drawn from the local population, or are they filled with ranks of "foreigners" from other places? Do the guerrillas have a safe haven to operate from, or terrain to use as cover for their operations, or are they stuck with flat, exposed country in which even dead dogs can be spotted a half mile away?

Ironically, as far as Iraq goes the conclusion to my first "101" essay is essentially the same as this:

What you watch for then is how patient our guys are. The Iraqis have no love for us, because we have invaded their country. Never lose sight of this fact. It doesn't matter if we're there to "liberate" them... we're big, scary, weird looking, and in their front yard. Only by being patient, by removing the bastards with the sniper rifles and the mortars, without killing anyone else, will they decide we are the lesser of two evils. When that happens they'll do our work for us, because unlike us they know Achmed's kid Achmad is no damned good and has been playing with some awfully smelly stuff in his basement lately. It is only with the villagers' help that we'll transform a successful suicide bombing into a dumb kid sitting in a cell.